Table of Contents
Part V: A Christian World View: The
Framework of History
Religion, Philosophy, and Technology
WHAT WE have
been trying to show is that the historical process reflects the
interaction between three families of people descended respectively
from the three sons of Noah to whom God appears to have apportioned
specific responsibilities and equally specific capabilities for
the fulfillment of them: to Shem, responsibility for man's religious
and spiritual well-being; to Japheth, his mental well-being;
and to Ham, his physical well-being. By this apportionment it
is not implied that every Semite has tended to be more religiously
minded, and every Japhethite more interested in intellectual
exercise, and every Hamite more mechanically inclined or more
practical than members of the other two families. All that is
intended is that the great religions of the world -- true and
false (46) -- had
their roots in the family of Shem, all true philosophical systems
have originated within the family of Japheth, (47) and the world's basic technology is a Hamitic contribution.
We have then noted that when these three worked together in
balanced harmony, civilization as a whole has advanced because
maximurn restraints have been placed upon the evil consequences
of sin while the purposes of God are being carried forward.
46. The paganism of the Old World, rooted
in Babylonian religious beliefs (see A. Hislop, The Two Babylons,
Loizeau Brothers, New York, 1953): Mohammedanism; and Judaism,
with its outgrowth Christianity. Hinduism is not a religion in
the sense that these are, but a religiously coloured philosophy.
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47. I think it is noteworthy that the gods of the Hamitic peoples
have tended to be gods of power; the god of the Aryans, a god
of intellectual enlightenment; and the God of Israel, a God of
the salvation of the soul.
It is important to observe that all three are
necessary for this. If any one element is given over-emphasis
the ultimate effect is detrimental. No society prospers which
is overly materialistic, or overly intellectual, or overly spiritual.
Man is neither an animal nor an angel. He cannot dedicate himself
to mere physical survival and the exploitation of his animal
appetites. Nor can he dedicate himself to nurturing his soul
to the neglect of his body. And by the same token, of course,he
cannot retire to an ivory tower either, for then he must starve
in body and soul.
One of the effects of the Fall
is to rob man of a proper balance. He becornes a creature of
extremes, of improper enthusiasms, of unbalanced dedications,
and correspondingly of a tendency to fatal neglect. Many neglect
their spiritual life in our materialistically oriented culture.
Many neglect the nceds of the body in the mystically oriented
cultures of lndia. Many neglect the exercise of their minds,
as primitive peoples have often been accused of doing. (48) Any such neglect violates
human nature and severely hinders the normal development of the
whole man. Both excess and neglect are equally unhappy in their
consequences and serve rathcr to heighten than to restrain the
disastrous effects of the Fall. Neither the spiritual contribution
of Shem, nor the intellectual conltribution of Japhteth, nor
the technological contribution of Ham really benefit man as they
were intended to do without the balancing constraint of the other
We have also noted that only
when the contribution of Japheth is effectively brought to bear
upon the contribution of Shem does theology emerge; and theology
does not emerge without it. Moreover, when this
same intellectual contribution of Japheth is applied to the technology
of Ham, then science emerges, and science does not emerge without
it. This does not really mean that the contribution of Japheth
is more irnportant than the other two, for it might just as easily
have been stated in reverse. The philosophizing of Japheth leads
nowhere without the pabulum of technology supplied by Ham, and
this pabulum far antedates any scientifc philosophizing
of Japheth, as we shall
48. I do not mean by this that primitive people are potentially
any less intelligent: only that they seem to rest content with a thorough
knowledge of the total wisdomof their culture without challenging, exploring,
or seeking to understand the rationale of it. 'I'hey neglect mental activity
for its own sake. The important difference between intelligence and accumulated
knowledge is explored in an interesting way in "Establishing a Paleolithic
IQ" (see Part
III in Genesis and Early Man, vol.2 of The Doorrway Papers
Series) which deals with early man as well as modern primitives.
show. By the same token,
human intellect does not do well in its reach after spiritual
truth apart from revelation: indeed, it leads rather into darkness
and general skepticism. Between Malachi and Matthew God remained
silent, while at the same time the outworkings of Greek philosophy
were permitted to run their course in the search for ultimate
reality and spiritual understanding. And how did it end? It ended
in almost total skepticism summed up in Pilate's cynical and
yet perhaps honest question, "What is truth?" I suggest
that this is why Paul, after visiting Athens and seeing there
their altar to "an Unknown God" (Acts 17:23), suddenly
realized with new force how hopeless it was even for the best
intellects in the world and under ideal conditions to arrive
at a true understanding of the nature of God and man's relationship
to Him. This, I suggest, is why he wrote later to the Corinthians
and said, "After that, in the wisdom of God, the
world by wisdom knew not God," then God sent forth
His Son (1 Corinthians 1:21). Thus did God permit Japheth to
discover for himself the inadequacy of the contribution he could
make apart from the revelation of God which came through Shem.
However, it is in harmony
with this view of history that after the revelation of Himself
had been established through the Old Testament -- the nature
of true religion, of true worship, of what God required of man
and of what man might hope for in God -- and after God had completed
(really, "fulfilled") the Old Testament revelation
in the Person of Jesus Christ His Son and seen to it that the
details of His rnessage and lifework were sufficiently preserved
in a record, the Gospels -- then God turned to the Gentiles,
the Japhethites, to take this body of religious truth and set
it forth as a Christian theology. God used Hebrew for the Old
Testament and probably a form of Semitic speech, namely, Aramaic,
as the basis of the Gospel record. (49) But then He turned to a Japhetic language in order
to convert this revelation into a structured organic systematized
faith, in short, into a theology.
It will be worth examining to what
extent scholars have recognized the uniqueness of Semitic forms
of speech, and particularly of Hebrew, as a vehicle for the presentation
of truth which concerns man's soul, and then to explore Japhetic
49. On this question, sce Edouard Naville,
Archaeology of the Old Testament: Was the Old Testamerit Written
in Hebrew, Scott, London, 1913, 212 pp., and see especially
pp.3-29; and also George Lamsda, The Four Gospels According
to the Eastern Version Translated from the Aramaic, Holman,
Philadelphia, 1933, Introduction, pp. v-xxii.
languages as the most
perfect vehicle for the organization of this revealed truth into
a Christian theology.
The Influence of Language on Thinking
perhaps significant that of all peoples who can trace themselves
back or who can be traced back to Japheth, the Greeks
have been most forward in recognizing him as their great progenitor,
under the name Japetos. It is as though God wished us to know
in no uncertain terms that it was Shem through whom the initial
revelation came to us, and Japheth through whom that revelation
was finally set in order. Yet the two languages are fundamentally
different. In a study of the contrast between Greek and Hebrew
thought, Thorlief Boman has gone to great lengths to show how
different are these two modes of speech and consequently how
different are the ways of thinking which these two languages
allow. One might even say predetermined. (50) In a critical study of
Boman's views, Professor James Barr in spite of his hostility
towards them, has nicely summarized the position taken by Boman
and others, as follows. (51)
First, the contrast
is made between "the static and the dynamic." The Greeks
were ultimately interested in contemplation, in withdrawing from
"doing," in order to be free to meditate and to reason.
The Hebrews were not interested in philosophy per se,
but only in action. Their religious zeal was dynamic. Secondly,
the contrast is between the "abstract" and the "concrete."
Barr states it: (52)
It is a characteristic procedure
of Greek thought to work with abstractions. Abstract terms of
the kind we call qualities and properties are essential in this
kind of discussion. . . . Hebrew thought, on the other hand,
does not work with abstractions; its terms are always related
to the actual object or situation and not to an abstraction from
it.. . . The contemplative approach, by contrast, means dissociation
of the mind from involvement in action. In Hebrew thought the
thinking object is the acting person.
contrast is in "the conception of man," as Barr puts
it: (53) "In
Greek thought man is seen as a duality, with an irnmortal soul
imprisoned or confined in a mortal body; the two are
50. Boman, Thorlief, Hebrew Thought Compared
with Greek, SCM Press, London, 1960.
51. Barr, James, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford,
52. Ibid., p.11.
53. Ibid., p.12.
only temporarily or accidentally
related. In Hebrew thought the soul is the living person
in his flesh."
This dualism versus monism
has been viewed as analogous to the difference between a rider
(the soul) on a horse (the body), and a centaur, a soul-body
entity. In the Old Testament, and not unnaturally to some extent
in the Gospels, the soul is without hesitation taken as the whole
man. Thus by inspiration and looking forward to the Lord's Resurrection
David said, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hell":
and in saying this he meant as much his spirit as he did his
body. In the Epistles, by contrast, rnan is taken apart, the
body, the soul, and the spirit, being concretely ‹ or perhaps
one should say, discretely ‹ divisible (Hebrews 4:12). Such
a prayer as that our whole soul and body and spirit might be
preserved blameless is a Greek concept of man rather than a Hebrew
one, though God saw fit to set forth both concepts in Scripture.
Thus it comes about that in the New Testament the construction
of biblical psychology in this matter is quite possible and certainly
worth attempting. But the Old Testarnent does not encourage the
making of such an attempt, though it provides the basic framework
in a different form The two complement each other, and the complementarity
resides ultimately in the difference between the two languages,
not merely in vocabulary but in mode of expression, way of thinking,
in its view of reality.
The extent to which this difference is
dependent primarily upon language and secondarily upon the kind
of mentality which emerges as an individual matures while speaking
that language is noted by Barr. The point at issue here is very
similar to the old question of the hen and the egg: which came
first? Only in this case, I think the answer is clearer. It is
the language which we learn as children that orders our thought
processes as we mature, until we come to equate the two and to
presume that we are thinking first and then finding words to
express our thought, while all the time the vocabulary and grammar
of our language is determining for us how we shall view reality.
As B. L. Whorf rightly observed, (54) we see things not as they are but as we
are, a fact of fundamental importance which every once in a while
becomes startlingly clear when we come to discuss some subject
of mutual interest with a person whose language differs from
54. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "Science and
Linguistics," Technology Review, vol.48, 1940.
It is perfectly true that we do think first and then
put our thoughts into words whenever we are trying to comrnunicate
in a language which is not our own. Indeed, it is universally
agreed that we do not really master any language until we think
in it, without any need for translation, a circumstance which
proves the point I am making, i.e., that we think in words.
It will be worth pausing for a
moment at this point before proceeding to examine the implications
of this, to consider a few opinions on the matter from those
best qualified to speak, namely, the linguists.
Although the intimate relationship
between word and thought has been remarked upon and studied since
the time of Humboldt, it is only in recent years that the natter
has become a subject of study in its own right and not merely
as a side issue in general linguistics. Two names stand out pre-eminently
in relation to this, namely, Ernst Cassirer and Benjamin Lee
Whorf. As an introcluction to what Whorf called metalinguistics,
the following quotations are taken from miscellaneous writings
of his, and although they are extracts from a number of separate
papers, they can be read consecutively as though they were a
continuum. In a paper entitled, "Science and Linguistics,"
he wrote: (55)
Talking, or the use of language,
is supposed only "to express" what is essentially already
formulated (in the mind). Formulation is an independent process,
called thought or thinking, and is supposedto be largely indifferent
to the nature of particular languages. Languages have grammars
which are assumed to be merely norms of conventional and social
correctness but the use of language is suppose to be guided not
so much by them as by correct, rational, or intelligrent thinking.
Thought, in this view, does not
depend on grammar but on laws of logic or reason which are supposed
to be the same for all observers of the universe -- to represent
a rationale in the universe that can be "found" independently
by all intelligent observers, whetlher they speak Chinese or
he continues: (56)
When linguists became able to
examine critically and scientifically a large number of languages
of widely different patterns . . . it was found that the grammar
of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing
ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas [my emphasis],
the programme and guide for the individual's mental activity,
for his analysis of impressions. . . .
55. Ibid., p.3 of reprint.
56. Ibid., p.5 of reprint.
of ideas is not an independent process . . . but part of a particular
grammar, and differs as between different grammars. We dissect
nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories
and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not
find there simply because they stare every observer in the face:
on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux
of impression which has to be organized by our minds -- and this
means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. . . .
This fact is very significant for
modern science for it means that no individual is free to describe
nature with absolute impartiality, but is constrained to certain
modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free.
The person most nearly free in such respects would be a linguist
familiar with very many widely different linguistic systems.
As yet no linguist ever is in any such position. We are thus
introduced to a new principle . . . which holds that all observers
are not [my emphasis] led by the same physical evidence
to the same picture of the universe unless their linguistic backgrounds
are similar or can in some way be calibrated.
This rather startling conclusion is not
so apparent if we compare only our modern European languages.
. . . Among these tongues there is an unanimity of major pattern
whichat first seems to bear out natural logic. But this unanimity
exists only because these tongues are all Indo-European dialects
cut out of the same basic plan, being historically transmitted
from what was long ago one speech community. . . .
When Semitic, Chinese, Tibetan,
or African languages are contrasted with our own, the divergence
in analysis of the world becomes more apparent; and when we bring
in the native languages of the Americas where speech communities
for many millennia have gone their ways independently of each
other and of the Old World, the fact that languages dissect nature
in many different ways becomes patent. The relativity of all
conceptual systems, ours included, and their deperdence upon
a language [my emphasis] stands revealed.
What surprises most is to find
that various grand generalizations of the Western World, such
as time, velocity, and matter, are not essential to the construction
of a consistent picture of the Universe. 0
paper of his entitled "Language and Logic," Whorf wrote: (57)
We cut up and organize the spread
and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother
tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because
nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see.
Languages differ not only in how they build their sentences but
in how they break down
57. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "Language and
Logic," Technology Review, vol.43, 1941, p.21.
nature to secure the elements to put
in those sentences. . . . For as goes our segmentation of the
face of nature, so goes our physics of the Cosmos.
Then in a further
paper entitled "The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behaviour
to Language," Whorf wrote: (58)
How does such a network of language,
culture, and behaviour come about historically? Which was first,
the language patterns or the cultural norms? In the main they
have grown up together, constantly influencing each other. But
in this partnership the nature of the language is the factor
that limits free plasticity and rigidifies channels of development
in the rmore autocratic way.
Thus far, then,
we see the direction in which modern thinking about the relationship
between language and thought, language and World View, language
and how people perceive the world about them has been going.
In a volume of the collected works of Whorf we may extract one
or two further insights. With respect to the question of whether
thought is possible without some kind of verbalization, Whorf
wrote, "The linguistic side of silent [his emphasis]
thinking, thinking without speaking, is of a nature as yet little
At this point there is a footnote as follows:
Some have supposed thinking
to be entirely linguistic. Watson, I believe, holds or held this
view, and the great merit of Watson in this regard is that he
was one of the first to point out and teach the very large and
unrecognized linguistic element in silent thinking. His error
lies in going the whole hog; also, perhaps, in not realizing
or at least not emphasizing that the linguistic aspect of thinking
is not a biologically organized process . . . but a cultural
organization, i.e., a language [his emphasis].
Thus Whorf would
not argue that all things that go on in the mind involve the
use of words, but he does hold categorically that one cannot
think conceptually, one cannot build a philosophy or a World
View silently and to oneself, except by the use of words.
As a heading to one of his papers,
there is a quotation from Edward Sapir which reads: (60)
Human beings do not live in
the objective world alone, nor
58. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, "The Relation
of Habitual Thought and Behaviour to Language" in Language,
Culture, and Personality, Menasha, Wisconsin, 1941, p.91.
59. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, Language, Thought and Reality, Selected
Writings of B. L. Whorf, The Technology Press of M.I.T.,
Wiley, New York, 1956, p.66.
60. Ibid., p.134.
alone in the world of social activity
as ordinarily understood but are very much at the mercy of the
particular language which has become the medium of expression
for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one
adjusts to reality without the use of language and that language
is merely an accidental means of solving specific problems of
communication or reflection.
The fact of the matter is that the "real
world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the
language habits of the group. . . . We see and hear and otherwise
experience very largely as we do because the language habits
of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.
The extent to
which a word imposed upon some object can predetermine our whole
attitude towards that object is strikingly borne out by a simple
experiment conducted by Dr. Samuel Glucksberg of Princeton, who
found that by giving a common wrench a nonsense label, in this
case calling it a "jod," he could greatly increase
the number of novel uses to which a group of students imagined
it could be put. In other words, given an ordinary wrench which
was just called a "wrench," when the students were
invited to imagine themselves isolated somewhere and limited
entirely to the use of this one tool and then to list all the
things they thought might be done with it, they did fairly well.
But when they were handed the same tool and told that it was
a "jod" and that they were not to think of it by its
old name, they did a great deal better and managed to dream up
many more useful applications for it. Glucksberg has also said,
"To a certain extent the name determined and limited what
the object was and therefore what it could be used for."
(61) In the light
of this experiment it is a measure of Humboldt's perceptiveness
that he could write so long ago: (62)
Man lives with his objects chiefly
‹ one may say exclusively ‹ as language presents them
to him. By the same process whereby he spins language out of
his own being, h,e ensnares himself in it; and each language
draws a magic circle round the people to which it belongs, a
circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out it
It is not hard
to see that since language is passed on to each new generation
with comparatively small changes in its grammatical structure,
though its vocabulary may change, any society will tend to perpetuate
its own way of looking at things. And as
61. Gluckberg, Samuel, "Human Inventiveness,"
Science News, Mar. 4, 1967, p.216.
62. Humboldt: quoted by Ernst Cassirer, Language and Myth,
Dover Publication, New York, 1946, p.9.
there are families of
language, so there will be families of peoples who tend to see
things in the same way. Since Indo-Europeans have for some reason
maintained the evident relationships in their particular family
of languages -- and the same observation applies within the Semitic
languages ‹ it is not surprising that even though they have
spread so widely they have continued to share a certain way of
looking at things: Indo-Europeans philosophically with an emphasis
upon the abstract and the Semites with their emphasis upon behaviour
from a more transcendental point of view. But what shall we say
of the Hamites? From all over the world, wherever they are found
and wherever linguists have examined their speech forms and the
philosophy of their grammar (to use Jespersen's term), the witness
is the same. Their view of the world is an entirely practical
one, rooted in the present, wise in a canny sort of way, specific,
particular, uninterested in the abstract, inventive, always creating
new words or new terms for things, interested in particulars
rather than categories, earthy, and very largely disinterested
in unlikely possibilities. While we may think of primitive people
as being less truthful than ourselves ‹ and most if not all
"primitive" people known to us have belonged within
the family of Ham ‹ the fact of the matter is quite the reverse.
They find it difficult to think hypothetically, to do what every
scientist must do, i.e., to tell lies deliberately. If asked
a hypothetical question they will not answer it but reject the
question as not applicable. Asked how many apples, for example,
we would have between us if he had two and I had two, a native
would not say "four" but more probably, "Well,
I do not have two apples!"
Elie Reclus, an ethnologist, writing
some years ago and speaking of certain primitive tribes, notably
the Khonds, says of them: (63)
and sincere, they disdain to escape a peril to gain an advantage
at the price of a lie, or even a voluntary
inexactitude. . . .
It was one of the rare errors of
J. Stuart Mill to assert that uncivilized men take pleasure in
lying, and seem incapable of speaking the truth. . . . But the
great philosopher would have expressed himself otherwise if a
sojourn in tle Indies had brought him into contact with Gonds
and Khonds, with Malers, Birhors, Donthals, and others, who hold
truth sacred, and contract no engagement that they do not fulfill.
There is no graver
63. Reclus, Elie, Primitive Folk: Studies
in Comparative Ethnology, Walter Scott, London, no date,
offence than to suspect their word;
it is an insult which they wipe out with blood, and if they cannot
slay the offender, they kill themselves.
In a recent
communication, Miss Beatrice Myers, a missionary attending the
Summer Institute of Linguistics (U.S.A.) said that on one occasion
she asked a Cheyenne Indian how he would say, "This is your
house." His reply was: "If you owned the house, I wouldn't
have to tell you, so I wouldn't say it!" (64) Similarly, the Hopi will speak of ten men because
one can actually have ten men: but they would not speak of ten
days because one cannot have ten days. Such a concept as a negative
number is quite absurd, unless it is seen as a practical indebtedness
in economic, or some other such terms. We shall have occasion
shortly to docnment these observations extensively. In the meantime
it may be observed that while the family of Indo-European languages
is readily identifiable as a family, and the Semitic as a family,
this does not apply at all to the third group of languages, the
Harnitic. The fact is that Hamites have been so inventive that
they invent terms with equal facility, and their languages are
in such a constant state of flux that within a few generations
even tribes living just across a river from each other will find
themselves scarcely able to converse any longer. (65) It is the same strange
proliferating tendency which prevented the Egyptians, Hittites,
Sumerians, Chinese, and Central American Indians from developing
an alphabetical script, even though the numbers of signs they
were creating multiplied almost astronomically.
It appears to me that this very
fact may have been part of God's providential economy in order
to guarantee the quick dispersal of the family of Ham all over
the world, to open it up for their brethren who were to follow.
A community of language
64. In a letter to her supporters in America
and Canada, 1968.
65. Rapid change of native languages: there seem to be several
contributing factors at work here. One, which is cultural, is
the practice of giving new names to things which for one reason
or another have become "dangerous" to speak about because
of some circumstance in their "history," or association
with the dead. Another is the tendency to see what is specificaily
different rather than similar in a series of situations. Thus
while we strike various kinds of "blows" with the hand
(a tap, a pat, a push, a press, a stroke, etc.), we would retain
the common word ''hand'' in each case. Natives do not. A "tap
with the hand" would be one word, "pat with the hand"
an entirely different one. There are hundreds of words for some
particular animal seen in various lights, but no single word
for the animal genus. People also adopt names of items as personal
names and these then become taboo when the person dies, and have
to be replaced!
unites people and binds
them together. By contrast, when languages proliferate easily
to the point of mutual unintelligibility, the tendency to congregate
is undermined and dispersion is assisted. It may thus have been
God's way not merely of sharpening their nventive genius, but
of ensuring that they would spread at the same time. What divided
the Hamites in this way was not a difference in language structure,
for the philosophy of their languages remained remarkably similar,
so that the ways of thinking of the African native, the Chinese
peasant, and the American Indian remained for a very long time
comparable; it was the vocabularies which changed. This was not
nearly so true with Semites or Indo-Europeans.
But even today, with mobility so
tremendously increased and means of rapid communication so greatly
extended, it is still true in a way that was largely unexpected,
that people hold on to their native language with great tenacity.
As Kroeber put it, "Speech tends to be one of the most persistent
populational characters and 'ethnic' boundaries are most often
speech boundaries." (66)
So it is important to note the
difference between the grammar of a language and its vocabulary,
for the latter changes constantly whereas the former remains.
And it is the grammar which really holds the key to the World
View. Ernst Cassirer in speaking of the "inward form of
language," put it this way: (67)
The form of observation, which
underlies all speech and language development, always expresses
a peculiar spiritual character, a special way of conceiving and
apprehending. The difference between the several languages, therefore,
is not a matter of different sounds and marks [i.e., ideographs],
but of different world conceptions. . . . Language never denotes
simply objects, things as such, but always conceptions. . . .
The nature of concepts depends on the way this active viewing
It is not what
we see so much as how we see it, and as we have already said,
we do not see how things are, but how we are. Cassirer
put it this way: "It is not a question of what we see in
a certain perspective, but of the perspective itself." (68) To revert once more to
Whorf in connection with the difference between the word-content
of a sentence and the structure of the sentence itself, i.e.,
the vocabulary as opposed to the grammar, we find this observation:
66. Kroeber, A. L., Anthropology, Harcourt,
Brace, New York, 1948, p.221.
67. Cassirer, Ernst, Language and Myth, Dover Publication,
New York, 1946, p.30.
68. Ibid., p.11.
69. Whorf, Benjamin Lee, Language, Thought, and Reality,
The Technological Press of M.I.T., Wiley, New York, 1956, p.258.
of specific words are less important than we fondly fancy. Sentences,
not words, are the essence of speech, just as equations and functions
and not bare numbers are the real meat of mathematics.
By the same
token he holds that thinking is not dependent so much upon words
per se as upon sentences. He spells this out: (70)
Actually, thinking is most mysterious,
and by far the greatest light upon it that we have is thrown
by the study of language. This study shows that the forms of
a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern
of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived
intricate systematization of his own language -- shown readily
enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages,
especially those of a different linguistic form. His thinking
itself is in a language ‹ in English, in Sanskrit, in Chinese.
And every language is a vast pattern
system, different from others, in which are culturally ordained
the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates,
but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationships
and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of
his consciousness. This doctrine is new to Western Science, but
it stands on unimpeachable evidence.
70. Ibid., p.252.
(Chapter continued . . . .)
Copyright © 1988 Evelyn White. All rights
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